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Abstract 
In an ideal world, conversations about whether a particular 
system is safe, or whether a particular method or tool 
enhances safety, would be emotion-free discussions 
concentrating on the level of safety required, available 
evidence, and coherent logical, mathematical, or scientific 
arguments based on that evidence. In the real world, 
discussions about safety are often not emotion-free. Political 
and economic arguments may play a bigger role than logical, 
mathematical, and scientific arguments, and psychological 
factors may be as important, or even more important, than 
purely technical factors. This paper illustrates the conundrum 
that can result from this clash of the ideal and the real by 
means of an imagined conversation among a collection of 
fictional characters representing various types of people who 
may be participating in a safety discussion.  
1 Introduction 
In an ideal world, conversations about whether a particular 
system is safe, or whether a particular method or tool 
enhances safety, would be emotion-free discussions 
concentrating on the level of safety required, available 
evidence, and coherent logical, mathematical, or scientific 
arguments based on that evidence. A quick perusal of a 
safety-critical systems e-mail list, a few minutes sitting in a 
standards creating committee, a hour or two attending a 
system safety conference, or a day participating in a safety 
review meeting are enough to demonstrate conclusively that 
the real world is often far from ideal.  
 
In real world discussions about safety, emotions often flow 
freely; opinions, anecdotes, and pronouncements from experts 
may substitute for evidence; and political and economic 
arguments may play a bigger role than logical, mathematical, 
and scientific arguments. Psychological factors such as 
emotion, mood, and affect may be as important as, or even 
more important than, purely technical factors. 
 
To illustrate the conundrum that can result from this clash of 
the ideal and the real, and to reduce the likelihood that anyone 
will be directly offended, this paper is written as a 
conversation among a collection of fictional characters. 
Although the conversation is realistic (so much so that 
probably every system safety researcher or practitioner 
reading this paper will be able to identify with it), the people, 
organizations, products, and standards mentioned in the paper 
are entirely fictional. Any resemblance to real people (living 
or dead), organizations (operating or defunct, private or 
public sector), or products (sold or discontinued) is purely 
coincidental; any resemblance to real standards is not 
coincidental. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 
introduces the fictional conversation; Sections 3-6 contain the 
conversation itself; and Section 7 presents suggestions about 
how the conversation might be used fruitfully by system 
safety researchers and practitioners. 
2 Background 
This section introduces the characters that participate in the 
fictional safety discussion, the context in which that 
discussion takes place, and the format in which it is presented. 
2.1 The Players 
Six characters constitute the cast. 
 
• Samantha (called Sam by her friends, and those who 
instinctively shorten any name that can be shortened): a 
brilliant, conscientious, humble engineer whose sole 
professional goal is to advance the state-of-the-practice in 
system safety engineering. She is an independent consultant. 
 
• Lawrence (never called Larry even by his few friends): a 
brilliant, ambitious, egotistical academic researcher at 
Yafordton University, one of the world’s most highly 
respected universities. His sole professional goal is to insure 
the adoption of his tools and methods throughout the world, 
not because he is unethical, but because he has convinced 
himself that they are the best tools and methods available. 
 
• Martin: a hard-working, but not particularly intelligent, 
engineering manager in whose hands rests the final decisions 
about the tools, methods, and standards to be used on safety-
critical systems developed by his employer, Only the Best 
Products (OBP). Most everyone thinks Martin believes 
everything that Lawrence says, but Martin denies it. 
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• Isadora: a senior researcher at SLG (Safety Laboratory of 
the Government), a government research laboratory that has 
sponsored much of Lawrence’s work. Many people think she 
harbours resentment towards him because of negative 
comments he frequently makes about the competence of SLG 
researchers. 
 
• Jill: a former graduate student of Lawrence’s; now an 
important member of the international committee revising the 
IRV-36 standard, which is applied widely across the world in 
several industries to safety-critical software systems. She 
continues to respect Lawrence’s intellect and 
accomplishments, but no longer considers him to be 
infallible; she works for OBP’s chief competitor, Really the 
Best, Incorporated (RBI). 
 
• Calvin: a first year graduate student at a local university. He 
is attending his first system safety conference in hopes of 
getting ideas for thesis research topics. 
2.2 The Setting 
These six people find themselves sitting together at a lunch 
table during the second day of an international system safety 
conference. After a bit of idle chit-chat, the conversation turns 
more serious.  
2.3 The Format 
The remaining sections of the paper present the fictional 
conversation. The name is given whenever the speaker 
changes. Quotation marks are omitted. Non-spoken actions or 
clarifying remarks are denoted by italics. 
3 The Conversation: Act I 
Lawrence: Enough about kids, cats, and other drivel. Let’s 
talk about something important to us all. He turns his 
attention towards Jill. What I want to know is if there’s a 
chance, Jill, that you people are going to get it right this time. 
What do you think? 
 
Jill (looking perplexed): I think I don’t know what you are 
talking about. 
 
Lawrence: Sure you do. I’m asking if you think that the 
standards committee you’re on is going to fix the mess it 
made last time with IRV-36. 
 
Isadora: Oh, come on, Lawrence, what do you expect her to 
say: ‘No, we’re trying to keep it a mess?’ 
 
Jill: Well, if you think the current version is bad, I don’t think 
you’re going to be thrilled with the revision. We aren’t 
making any radical changes. There’s no reason to — it works. 
 
Lawrence (clucking his tongue): How can you say it works!? 
You’ve read my technical criticisms! You know everyone 
thinks it costs industry millions! 
 
Martin: That’s the truth. If we didn’t have to comply with 36, 
we could save a ton of money. 
 
Samantha: I hear that all the time, but I’ve never seen any 
data to substantiate the claim. 
 
Martin: It’s not like we’re going to show the world our 
financial records. 
 
Isadora: Nope, OBP won’t even let us, a government research 
lab, see anything when we’re willing to keep the data private 
and sanitize it so we can try to get a handle on what’s really 
going on.  And, of course, it’s not just OBP, RBI won’t do it, 
either, nor will any of the other companies. 
 
Samantha: Even if you did get the data somehow, it wouldn’t 
necessarily mean anything. Suppose companies are spending 
a whole lot of money complying with IRV-36.  How do we 
know that this is money that wouldn’t have to be spent to 
make a system sufficiently safe anyway, even if there wasn’t 
IRV-36? 
 
Lawrence (rolling his eyes, and looking quite thoroughly 
disgusted): I don’t know you, Sam, and apparently you don’t 
know my work. If you did, you’d know that I’ve shown how 
to prove systems safe in ways that aren’t even mentioned in 
36, and they’re so simple and easy to use no one can doubt 
they’d be cheaper.  
 
Jill: Despite what you think, Lawrence, just because you write 
something doesn’t make it true.  In the real world, most of us 
want to see some data, not just accept pronouncements from 
ivory towers. Unless I’m mistaken, no system is out there 
being used by the public that was developed using your 
methods. There are hundreds, perhaps thousands, of real 
systems with subsystems or components that were created 
following IRV-36.  There’s yet to be an accident to a single 
one of those systems that’s been attributed to a 36-compliant 
subsystem. 
 
Samantha: Right, that’s the point. Following the standard 
works. Perhaps it costs a whole lot to follow it — although 
I’d still not convinced of that — but so what?  Better safe 
than sorry. 
 
Martin: That’s easy for you to say, Samantha, since you’re a 
consultant. Much of the money we spend goes to people like 
you to help us comply with the standard. I’d be astonished if 
you wanted anything to change.  
 
Samantha (with a pained express): Hey … 
 
Martin: Sorry, that wasn’t really fair. … I just think there are 
too many safety people who act like money doesn’t matter, 
and that any mention of cost is somehow unethical. 
 
Jill (trying to alleviate some of the tension): It’s not that 
thinking about money is unethical, but it essentially comes 
down to what is more important: safety or money? A good 
engineer will try to ensure safety first. Both are important 
concerns for the engineer, so I do agree with you there 
Martin. 
 
Samantha: I agree with Jill. Talking about costs isn’t 
unethical, it’s important. I just think that without any real data 
to substantiate claims of something costing too much, and 
with real data about safety, the only wise thing to do is to stay 
with what’s gotten us there. 
 
Lawrence: Sammy, Sammy, Sammy, I taught you better. Just 
because systems built to comply with IRV-36 end up being 
safe — and I’m not conceding that’s even true — does not 
mean that IRV-36 had anything to do with it. They could be 
safe despite the standard. 
 
Isadora: I could be an alien from Alpha Centauri, too, but I 
think we’re all better off assuming I’m not. Same thing here. 
It may be theoretically possible that IRV-36 has nothing to do 
with the safety of the systems, but since it’s about the only 
thing common across a wide spectrum of systems, we’re 
better off assuming it has something to do with it. 
 
Samantha: Isadora’s right, Lawrence. The data doesn’t prove 
that following 36 guarantees safety, but it is consistent with 
that being the case. And we have no data to the contrary. 
 
Lawrence: Ah, but we have something better than data: 
formal proofs. I’ve proven in several papers that it is possible 
to satisfy some of the requirements in 36 without truly 
accomplishing what those requirements claim to accomplish. 
It doesn’t catch everything. So the standard is deficient. 
Q.E.D. We don’t need data to know it. 
 
Jill: No one is claiming that the standard is perfect. I wouldn’t 
be on the revision committee if I thought it was perfect. Sure, 
it has deficiencies. But it has been used for over a decade, 
and, as I’ve said before, there has yet to be an accident. That 
says a lot more about the standard than your so-called proofs 
ever could. 
 
Calvin (hesitantly): Um … sorry to jump in here … 
 
Isadora: Don’t be sorry, you’ve got as much right as any of us 
to talk. 
 
Lawrence frowns, but does not say anything.  
 
Calvin: OK …. thanks. I’m a bit confused. (Looking at Jill) 
Are you saying that formal proofs don’t have any value? 
 
Jill: No, no, that’s not what I’m saying at all. 
 
Calvin: Phew. I was worried about what to say to my advisor 
when I get back to school. He’s big on formal methods. So, 
what are you saying? 
 
Jill: Formal proofs, model-checking, all that stuff can have 
real value when used properly. Some of my clients have 
found problems using formal methods that would’ve been 
really hard to find any other way.  I wasn’t making a general 
criticism, just a specific criticism of Lawrence giving more 
weight to his proofs than to the operational data that’s out 
there. 
 
Isadora (looking at Lawrence): Is that what you really think 
Lawrence? Do you really think we should disregard the 
evidence, because it contradicts your analysis? 
 
Lawrence: Of course not. Don’t be silly. I’m surprised that 
you (pointing at Isadora) could even ask such a question. I’m 
all for evidence, and a scientific foundation for all that we do. 
That’s what my career has been all about. 
 
At this point, the main course for lunch is served, so the 
conversation at the table quiets down, not quite to silence, but 
to nothing more than polite banter. 
4 The Conversation: Act II 
As people finish up their lunches, Martin is the first one to 
steer the conversation back to technical topics. 
 
Martin: So, before the food came, Lawrence had said that his 
career was all about building a scientific foundation for what 
we do. That’s how I’ve always seen it. (A tiny grin crosses 
Lawrence’s face.)  But I’m not sure we’ve made any real 
progress (The grin disappears). 
 
Isadora: What do you mean? 
 
Martin: Well, take my company for example. We’re building 
this new product. I can’t tell you anything about it, ‘cause 
we’ve not announced it to the public yet, and I’d get fired if I 
let something slip that Jill could take back to RBI. But the 
details aren’t important anyway, just that it has major safety 
issues: if it works right it could save lives, but if it works 
wrong it could kill people. … (Martin pauses to take a sip of 
water) … I’m asking my people the same questions about this 
product as I’ve been asking them for 20 years, and they’re 
giving me the same answers. Same thing happens between me 
and my bosses. It’s hard to see any progress. 
 
Jill: What sorts of questions? And, no, I’m not asking you to 
spill any company secrets. 
 
Martin: Stuff like this … We did a preliminary hazard 
analysis, and came up with some catastrophic hazards.  How 
do we know we identified them all?  We assigned likelihoods 
to those hazards occurring, using the same combination of 
historic data, calculations, and engineering judgement we 
always use.  How do we know we didn’t get it wrong?  
 
Lawrence: My … 
 
Isadora (interrupting): Yeah, we know, your tools would 
answer those questions. 
 
Lawrence: Actually, that’s not what I was going to say. I was 
going to say that my tools might help answer those questions. 
 
Martin: Right. That’s the point. Your tools, or someone else’s 
tools, might help. You don’t really know. Yet, if we had a 
solid scientific foundation, we ought to know whether they’d 
help.  Bridge builders don’t sit around wondering whether 
some piece of cable is strong enough to hold the weight it’s 
supposed to hold. They know. 
 
Samantha: Let’s not give bridge builders too much credit. 
Bridges fall down, you know. Remember Tacoma-Narrows 
and Minneapolis? 
 
Jill: True, but still, Martin has a point. Civil engineers have a 
lot more universally accepted techniques and standards to rely 
on than we do.  
 
Isadora: Sure, but civil engineering has been around for a 
very long time. Even if the name is only a few hundred years 
old, no one can tell me that the Egyptians didn’t do some civil 
engineering when they built the pyramids. Or the Romans 
with their roads and aqueducts.  
 
Lawrence: Can we get back to Martin’s situation? I’m not 
sure I get your point.  Are you saying that the systems we 
build today aren’t any safer than the ones we built in the past? 
 
Martin: Not really. Sure, some things have gotten safer. If I 
got in an accident in my car twenty years ago, I’d probably 
get killed. Today, I might not even get a scratch.  But I’m not 
sure any of this has come about because system safety 
engineering is on any firmer foundation now than it was in 
the past.  
 
Isadora: I tend to agree. Shoot, there are some papers being 
presented here this year that could’ve been presented at the 
first one of these conferences back before Calvin here was 
even born.  
 
Samantha (looking at Martin): I want to get back to the 
product you can’t tell us anything about for a moment. And 
maybe this isn’t really a fair question to ask you. If it isn’t 
don’t answer. But are you really concerned that OBP is going 
to start selling a product that isn’t as safe as it could be? 
 
Lawrence: Before he answers, I think we need to make that 
question more precise. As stated, the answer has to be yes. 
Every product ever sold could’ve been made safer. There are 
always more hazards that could be eliminated. We could 
completely get rid of the risk of mid-air collisions by only 
allowing one plane in the sky at a time. 
 
Samantha (giving Lawrence a look of mild disgust): I think 
everyone knows what I meant, but I’ll rephrase the question 
for the benefit of pedants like you. Martin, are you concerned 
that your company may start selling this new product before 
you’re confident that it is as safe as reasonably practicable? 
 
Martin: You’re right; it isn’t really a fair question. 
 
Samantha: Then don’t answer it. 
 
Martin: That’s okay.  The answer is sort of ‘yes and no’. I 
don’t worry that we will intentionally start selling the product 
knowing that it has dangers in it that we could’ve fixed if 
we’d tried. No one in my company would do such a thing, 
and if they tried, I’d blow the whistle without a second 
thought. … 
 
Jill (during Martin’s pause): Just for the record, I feel the 
same way about RBI, and I’d blow the whistle, too, if it 
turned out I was wrong. 
 
Martin: What does worry me … it even keeps me up at nights 
some times … is that we might miss a hazard, … or think that 
it’s extremely improbable to occur when it’s not, … or, … 
and this is probably my biggest worry, we might decide to 
spend more money mitigating one particular hazard and less 
on another, when the second hazard turns out to be the one 
that bites someone.  We just don’t know enough to be sure we 
won’t do those things. 
 
Lawrence (jokingly): You just need to hire smarter people, 
Martin. 
 
Isadora (not recognizing the joke): Not everyone is a genius 
like you, Larry. 
 
At this point, the Conference Chair comes to the microphone 
to make various announcements about the afternoon and 
evening events, while the servers collect the entree plates, and 
distribute dessert. 
5 The Conversation: Act III 
After the Chair sits down, Calvin speaks up.  
 
Calvin: Mind if the newbie asks another question? (Hearing 
no objections, he continues.) All of you seem to be committed 
to doing the best you can in your jobs, yet you seem to 
disagree on some rather basic things. Like whether the 
standard that’s the most widely used --- I think that’s right, 
isn’t it, IRV-26 … 
 
Jill: 36. IRV-36. It is the most widely used. 
 
Calvin: Thanks, sorry. Yeah. You can’t even agree on 
whether IRV-36 is a good standard or not. Here’s my 
question. Why do you all think that is? Why can’t you agree? 
I’d like to hear what each of you thinks, if that’s okay. 
 
Isadora: That’s a great question, Calvin.  
 
Lawrence (looking at Isadora): So, are you going to answer 
it? 
 
Isadora: Sure, but why don’t you go first? 
 
Lawrence: Gladly. I don’t think the standard is any good, for 
the reasons I’ve stated in my papers.  But you’re not really 
interested in what we think about the standard so much as 





Lawrence: I think we disagree, because some people do not 
fully understand the relative merit of different types of 
evidence. So, you have people like Jill here, who is a really 
smart woman by the way (He smiles and nods in Jill’s 
general direction), who don’t realize that formal, logical, 
rigorously defined evidence — like my proofs — should 
carry more weight than empirical evidence. It’s not her fault, 
really. The education system failed her. By the time she came 
to me as a graduate student, it was too late.  Think about the 
legal system, we still have jurors who give more weight to 
eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence than they 
do to DNA. It’s preposterous but they do.  For system safety, 
the closest thing we have to DNA is formal analysis. But not 
everyone understands that. 
 
Jill: I agree with Lawrence’s basic premise: different 
understandings of the relative merit of different types of 
evidence are at the root.  I even like his legal system analogy. 
Where I disagree is where the various types of evidence 
available in system safety fit within the analogy. I think that 
can vary from system to system, and even from parts of a 
system to other parts of a system. For some things, formal 
analysis may be the analogue to DNA, but for others, it may 
deserve no more weight than a demonstratively unreliable 
eyewitness. Lawrence is a brilliant man, but I don’t think he 
really comprehends the complexity of the real world. 
 
Samantha: I was planning to say something entirely different, 
but it is hard to not to follow the lead of those two. (She 
pauses briefly, glancing at Jill and then Lawrence). I, too, 
think the root of the disagreements rests in relative merit of 
evidence. When it comes to the specific issue of whether 
IRV-36 is a good standard or not, the theorist in me wants to 
say that it isn’t, for many of the same reasons that Lawrence 
explained in his papers. But the practical side of me can’t get 
past the fact that all of the operational evidence out there that 
seems to say that it is, at worst, not so bad. 
 
Martin: There’s a little more to it than just differences about 
relative merit of types of evidence. We could agree about 
relative merit, and still disagree about how to interpret a 
particular piece of evidence. For IRV-36, I think 
interpretation is the biggest cause of differences.  Even among 
people who give no weight to Lawrence’s criticisms, which is 
just about everyone I know by the way, there are sharp 
disagreements about whether the accident-freeness of systems 
developed with 36 really means anything. And despite the 
scepticism of some of the rest of you here, I still think there’s 
something to the claims that it costs too much. 
 
Isadora: Wow. I’ve not really given the question enough 
thought to have a good answer for you, Calvin. But what the 
rest of you have said has been much more interesting than 
anything I’ve heard in the conference sessions so far.  I think 
some of the things that we’ve discussed here could be great 
areas for research.  I’m going to look into getting something 
going at SLG. 
 
As Isadora finishes talking, the Conference Chair tells 
everyone it is time to head to the next sessions. 
6 The Conversation: Epilogue 
As people get up from the table to go their separate ways, 
Calvin taps Samantha on the shoulder, and speaks to her 
quietly. 
 
Calvin: Is it always like this? 
 
Samantha: What do you mean?  
 
Calvin: Bickering, sniping, talking past one another, stuff like 
that … does it happen all the time? 
 
Samantha (laughing): No, not all the time. Mostly just at 
meetings like this one. When people get down to doing real 
work, they’re usually quite reasonable … even Lawrence … 
occasionally.  
 
Calvin (relieved): That’s good to know. I was starting to 
wonder if I ought to get into some other field. It got better 
near the end, ‘though. Everyone seemed to take my question 
seriously. 
 
Samantha (seriously): It was a great question. We really need 
bright young people like you working in the field. Safety isn’t 
glamorous, and not many people strike it rich ensuring 
systems are safe, but there aren’t a whole lot of things you 
could do that are more important.  
7 Using the Paper 
We conclude by suggesting three ways that system safety 
researchers and practitioners may be able to use this paper. 
 
One use is to stimulate personal introspection by considering 
questions such as these: Which character comes closest to 
matching your beliefs and opinions about system safety 
issues?  Which character comes closest to matching your 
attitudes towards others in the field?  What might the positive 
and negative aspects of that character reveal about your own 
positives and negatives?   Knowing your own biases might 
help you facilitate constructive dialog among your peers. 
 
Another use is to stimulate group discussions.  Potential 
topics for discussion based on the conversation include the 
following: the proper role of standards compliance in 
ensuring and assuring safety; how to combine formal and 
informal arguments; how personal attitudes and demeanor 
may affect technical disagreements; the relevant merit and 
interpretation of different types of evidence; how much 
progress has been made in the field over the last few decades; 
and what can be learned from other disciplines about 
evaluating arguments and evidence. 
 
The third way that system safety professionals may consider 
using this paper is to promote the importance of constructive 
dialog within the profession.  As an informal reviewer of the 
first draft of this paper said, perhaps the most fictitious aspect 
of the paper is that, in the end, the characters are generally 
cordial with one another.  Too often within the system safety 
community, particularly within the research community, 
disagreements are not discussed cordially, and more effort 
seems to be devoted to tearing down the work of others than 
in advancing the field cooperatively.   We hope that this paper 
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